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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
 
Before the Court is a Cross-Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. No. 59) filed by Defendant 
ADS Security, LP (“ADS”) in response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant ADS under 
Rule 41(a) (Dkt. No. 58). ADS moves “that this case be declared exceptional and for attorneys’ 
fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.” (Dkt. No. 59 at 5).1 The Court held a hearing on the Motion 
on March 18, 2016. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Title 35 provides that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. An exceptional case under § 285 is “simply one 
that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position 
(concerning both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in 
which the case was litigated.” Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
1749, 1756 (2014). District courts “may determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-
case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1757; see 
also Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748 (2014). “After 
determining that a case is exceptional, the district court must determine whether attorney fees are 
                                                 
1 Citations to the record use the page number in the CM/ECF header. 
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appropriate,” which is within the Court’s discretion. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 
1448, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). A party must prove entitlement to attorney fees 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1758. 
BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiff Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, LLC (“RCDI”) filed its complaint 
against ADS on August 26, 2015 alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,788,090 (the ’090 
Patent). (Dkt. No. 1 in Case No. 2:15-cv-1463). On November 19, 2015 Defendant ADS sent an 
email to RCDI stating ADS’s belief that the ’090 Patent is invalid under 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 101 & 102. (Dkt. No. 60-1). ADS’s email predicted that “the E.D. Texas will declare the case 
against my client exceptional” and award attorneys’ fees, but ADS offered to make the case “go 
away quietly” if RCDI would pay $43,330 in “attorneys’ fees and costs.” (Id.). ADS represented 
that this amount included its attorneys’ fees incurred in preparing as-yet-unfiled Rule 11 and 
Rule 12(c) motions “which we will serve assuming our client’s settlement offer is rejected.” 
(Id.). RCDI rejected ADS’s offer November 20, 2015. (Dkt. No. 62-6). On November 24, 2015 
ADS filed a Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings that the ’090 Patent is invalid 
under § 101. (Dkt. No. 23). On December 28, 2015 ADS sent a “safe harbor” notice to RCDI 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) attaching a Rule 11 motion for sanctions. See (Dkt. No. 59-
2). On January 18, 2016—within the 21-day “safe harbor” period—RCDI filed a Notice of 
Withdrawal of Complaint, dropping its claims against ADS. (Dkt. No. 55).2 
  
                                                 
2 RCDI later re-styled its Notice as a “Motion to Dismiss” to comply with the Court’s Rules. 
(Dkt. No. 58). RCDI subsequently filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss reciting a covenant not 
to sue. (Dkt. No. 80). The Amended Motion was unopposed and was granted. (Dkt. No. 83). The 
parties do not dispute that RCDI complied with the Rule 11 safe harbor period. See, e.g., (Dkt. 
No. 59 at 12). 
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DISCUSSION 
I. The Safe Harbor 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) provides a “safe harbor” period whereby “the motion [for 
sanctions] must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the 
challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected 
within 21 days after service.” This safe harbor is designed to “give the parties at whom the 
motion is directed an opportunity to withdraw or correct the offending contention … and 
encourage the withdrawal of papers that violate the rule without involving the district court.” 
Cadle Co. v. Pratt, 524 F.3d 580, 586–87 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). It is well-settled that “[m]otions under Rule 11 and § 285 are different” and that § 285 
does not include a safe harbor provision. See Digeo, Inc. v. Audible, Inc., 505 F.3d 1362, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). However, the Court is not persuaded that § 285 should be applied in a manner 
that contravenes the aims of Rule 11—Plaintiff’s decision to voluntarily withdraw its complaint 
within the safe harbor period is the type of reasonable conduct Rule 11 is designed to encourage. 
The fact that Plaintiff timely withdrew its complaint “without involving the district court” 
weighs against a finding that Plaintiff litigated this case in an “unreasonable manner.”  
II. Plaintiff’s Pre-Suit Conduct 
 Defendant’s primary contention in seeking attorney fees, however, is not that Plaintiff’s 
conduct during this litigation was unreasonable but that Plaintiff failed to conduct an adequate 
pre-suit investigation and filed its complaint in bad faith. Specifically, Defendant contends that a 
“cursory review” of the ’090 Patent would have apprised Plaintiff of its patent-ineligibility under 
§ 101 and that fourteen different prior art references Defendant provided to Plaintiff between 
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December 2, 2015 and January 19, 20163 all render the ’090 Patent invalid as anticipated under 
§ 102. (Dkt. No. 59 at 13–16). 
“[F]or a case dismissed before trial to be designated exceptional, evidence of the frivolity 
of the claims must be reasonably clear without requiring a ‘mini-trial’ on the merits for 
attorneys’ fees purposes.” MacroSolve, Inc. v. Antenna Software, Inc., Case No. 6:11-cv-287, 
Dkt. No. 573 at 5 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2014), reconsideration denied, Dkt. No. 578, aff’d 637 
Fed. App’x. 591 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3904 (U.S. June 13, 2016). 
With respect to Defendant’s contention that the ’090 Patent is invalid under § 101, the Court 
observes that Plaintiff’s Response (Dkt. No. 35) and Sur-Reply (Dkt. No. 54) to Defendant’s 
Rule 12(c) Motion recite non-conclusory and facially plausible arguments supporting patent 
eligibility.4 Compare (Dkt. No. 35 at 11–12) (arguing the claims recite a computer system and 
“overcome problems specifically arising [in] computer-based communication 
networks”) with eDekka LLC v. 3balls.com, Inc., Case No. 2:15-cv-541, Dkt. No. 133 at 4, 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168610 at *13 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2015) (“The claims are not tied to a generic 
computer, let alone a specialized one”). Because Defendant’s 12(c) Motion is now moot, the 
Court will not delve deeply into the merits of the Motion, but the Court does find that Plaintiff’s 
arguments are non-frivolous.  
As for Defendants’ allegedly anticipating prior art, no motion seeking to invalidate any 
claim under § 102 has been filed in this case and claim construction has not taken place. Because 
                                                 
3 Specifically, ADS contends “[t]hree of these references were sent to Plaintiff on December 2, 
2015 … [s]ix more were served on Plaintiff along with ADS’s Rule 11 motion. And, five more 
were served with ADS’s invalidity contentions.” (Dkt. No. 59 at 14); see also (Dkt. No. 59-5 at 
7) (ADS’s invalidity contentions were served January 19, 2016). 
4 Plaintiff’s Response also attaches an expert declaration addressing issues relevant to patent 
eligibility under § 101. (Dkt. No. 35-1). 
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the issue has not been briefed, the Court could not conduct a “mini-trial” on anticipation even if 
it were proper to do so. Moreover, Plaintiff dismissed its complaint within a short period of time 
after receiving the allegedly invalidating references from Defendant (five of the references 
appear to have been served the day after Plaintiff filed its Notice of Withdrawal of Complaint). 
Thus, Defendant’s argument cannot be that RCDI litigated in an unreasonable manner after 
receiving notice of these references. Instead, Defendant’s contention seems to be that a 
reasonable pre-suit investigation should have brought these references to Plaintiff’s attention. 
But Defendant presents no evidence that Plaintiff knew or should have known of these fourteen 
references (with the exception of one—U.S. Patent No. 7,151,968—which was identified to 
Plaintiff in another litigation on May 29, 2015). (Dkt. No. 62-1 at 12).  
More importantly, Defendant does not explain why a reasonable pre-suit investigation 
would indicate that the ’090 Patent is invalid in view of these references. Patents are presumed 
valid under 35 U.S.C. § 282, but Defendant argues the ’090 Patent is anticipated because “[t]he 
prior art is rife with disclosures of systems that Plaintiff is accusing of infringement, including 
remotely configurable thermostats, coffeemakers, cameras, lighting apparatuses, alarm systems, 
and a host of other devices.” (Dkt. No. 59 at 15). To the extent this statement is representative of 
Defendant’s invalidity theory under § 102, it is a theory the Federal Circuit has consistently 
rejected: “practicing the prior art is irrelevant; it is the presence of the prior art and its 
relationship to the claim language that matters for invalidity.” Tate Access Floors v. Interface 
Architectural Res., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also, e.g., Nazomi 
Communications, Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“this court 
cautions against the nonviable ‘practicing the prior art’ defense”). Nothing in ADS’s Motion 
constitutes “reasonably clear” evidence of the frivolity of RCDI’s claims. 
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III. Plaintiff’s Conduct in Other Litigation 
ADS further argues that “[t]he size and structure of Plaintiff’s settlement payments 
correlate to a litigation position that lacks any substantive strength and supports a finding that 
Plaintiff is exploiting the high cost of complex litigation to extract nuisance value settlements.” 
(Dkt. No. 62 at 4). ADS submits thirteen RCDI settlement agreements under seal for in camera 
review. (Dkt. No. 64). “[A] pattern of litigation abuses characterized by the repeated filing of 
patent infringement actions for the sole purpose of forcing settlements, with no intention of 
testing the merits of one’s claims, is relevant to a district court’s exceptional case determination 
under § 285.” SFA Sys., LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 793 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015). However, 
the fact that a patentee has asserted a patent “against a wide variety of defendants and settled 
many of those cases for significantly less than litigation costs does not alone show bad faith.” 
MacroSolve, Case No. 6:11-cv-287, Dkt. No. 573 at 5. Punishing a Plaintiff for the mere fact that 
it has filed many lawsuits would surely “narrow the public’s access to the courts by chilling 
future decisions to seek redress for a case in which success is not guaranteed.” See eDekka, Case 
No. 2:15-cv-541, Dkt. No. 133 at 8. In the absence of any showing that RCDI acted 
unreasonably or in bad faith in the context of this suit, the Court will not conclude that RCDI’s 
prior settlements alone justify a finding that this case is exceptional.5 It is noteworthy that when 
ADS offered RCDI an opportunity to avoid testing the merits of its claims by paying a cost-of-
                                                 
5 ADS also belabors, both in its communications with RCDI and in its filings before this Court, 
the ignominious titles bestowed on the ’090 Patent by several websites and blogs. See, e.g., (Dkt 
No. 62 at 9–10). It goes without saying that a third party’s decision to award “Stupid Patent of 
the Month” to the ’090 Patent is not binding or persuasive legal authority. When deciding a 
motion under § 285 the relative reasonableness of the parties’ conduct is undisputedly 
paramount. ADS’s resort to name-calling does not commend it as the more reasonable party. 
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litigation settlement, RCDI declined and instead fully briefed a Response and Sur-reply 
addressing the merits of ADS’s 12(c) Motion on the issue of § 101 patent eligibility.6 
CONCLUSION 
ADS has not shown that RCDI litigated this case in an unreasonable manner or that this 
case “stands out from others” in terms of the substantive strength of RCDI’s litigating position. 
RCDI withdrew its complaint early in the case within the Rule 11 safe harbor period (before 
claim construction and before ADS’s invalidity contentions were due) and RCDI has presented 
facially non-frivolous responses to the arguments raised in ADS’s Rule 12(c) Motion. The Court 
finds that this case is not exceptional, considering the totality of the circumstances. ADS’s Cross-
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. No. 59) is DENIED. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Although Defendant’s Rule 12(c) Motion is now moot, it was not moot when the parties briefed 
it because Defendant maintained declaratory judgment counterclaims. The parties agree that 
RCDI’s subsequent covenant not to sue extinguishes those counterclaims. See (Dkt. No. 84 at 
29:15–17) (“MR. BAILEY: Your Honor, I think the case law is -- is well established that [the 
covenant] would divest the Court of jurisdiction over our DJ claims.”). 
